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Statutory Authority for Bankruptcy Judges
to Conduct Jury Trials: Fact or Fiction?
In re United Missouri Bank of Kansas City, N.A.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress, courts, and commentators have struggled during the last
century with the issue of whether a party to a bankruptcy proceeding has a
seventh amendment right to a jury trial.2 That issue is further complicated by
a second issue: whether a bankruptcy court has authority to conduct a jury
trial, or whether the jury trial must be removed to the district court. In 1989,
it appeared that the Uniied States Supreme Court would answer these two
questions in Granfinanciera v. Nordberg. The question presented in
Granfinanciera was whether the Granfinanciera Corporation, which had not
previously participated in the bankruptcy proceeding, was entitled to a jury
trial when sued by the trustee of the bankruptcy estate to recover an alleged
preferential transfer.4 The Supreme Court concluded that Granfinanciera was
entitled to a jury trial under the seventh amendment, but the Court expressly
declined to decide whether the bankruptcy court was authorized to hear a jury
trial.5
1. 901 F.2d 1449 (8th Cir. 1990).
2. See generally Bever & Cantrel, Jury Trials in the Bankruptcy Courts:
Awaiting a Final Verdict, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 799 (1989); Cyr, The Right to Trial by
Jury in Bankruptcy: Which Judge is to Preside?, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 53 (1989);
Ferriell, Constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act
of1984, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109 (1989); Comment, The Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984: The Impact on the Right of Jury Trial in Bankruptcy
Court, 16 TEX. TECFH. L. REV. 535 (1985); Gibson, Jury Trials in Bankruptcy:
Obeying the Commands ofArticle III and the Seventh Amendment, 72 MINN. L.REv.
967 (1988); King, Jurisdiction and Procedure Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of
1984, 38 VAND. L. REv. 675 (1985); Sabino, July Trials in the Bankruptcy Court:
The Controversy Ends, 93 COMM. L.J. 238 (1988); Warner, Katchen Up in Bankrupt-
cy: The New Jury Trial Right, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1989).
3. 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
4. Id. at 39. The suit alleged that Granfinanciera had received a 1.7 million dollar
payment from the Chase & Sanborn Corporation within one year before Chase &
Sanborn filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. Id. at 40.
5. Id. at 79-80.
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Since Granfinanciera, several circuits of the United States Courts of
Appeals have attempted to decide whether a bankruptcy judge has authority
to conduct a jury trial. 6 In In Re United Missouri Bank of Kansas City,7
which involved an alleged preferential transfer similar to the one in
Granfinanciera, the Eighth Circuit concluded that bankruptcy judges may not
preside over a jury trial because of a lack of statutory authority.8 The court
did not address the constitutional issues, but did acknowledge "the serious
constitutional problems posed by an alternative interpretation."9 This Note
will focus exclusively on the statutory implications raised by jury trials in the
bankruptcy forum, and will not discuss associated constitutional issues.
II. THE FACTS AND HOLDING
On February 13, 1987, the Kroh Brothers Development Company filed
a Chipter 1110 voluntary bankruptcy petition." The bankruptcy trustee for
Kroh Brothers filed suit on February 10, 1989, against United Missouri Bank
of Kansas City ("UMB") to recover alleged preferential transfers. The trustee
asserted that UMB improperly received a four million dollar payment from
Kroh Brothers only a few months before the company filed for bankruptcy.12
UMB had not filed a claim or participated in the bankruptcy proceedings
before the initiation of the trustee's action. 13
UMB asserted the right to a jury trial and requested the district court to
withdraw the case from the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.14 The jury
trial request stemmed from the recognition in Granfinanciera of a seventh
6. See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Frates (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 911 F.2d 380 (10th
Cir. 1990); In re United Missouri Bank of Kansas City, 901 F.2d 1449 (8th Cir. 1990);
Ben Cooper, Inc. v. The Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania (In re Ben Cooper, Inc.), 896 F.2d
1394 (2d Cir. 1990) vacated on other grounds, 111 S.Ct. 425 (1990).
7. 901 F.2d 1449 (8th Cir. 1990).
8. Id. at 1457.
9. Id.
10. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988).
11. In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co., 100 Bankr. 480, 481 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989).
Before declaring bankruptcy, Kroh Brothers was one of the largest real estate
development companies in Kansas City, Missouri. Id. Kroh Brothers Development
Company, its five affiliated corporations, and twenty-seven partnerships each filed
Chapter 11 petitions beginning February 13, 1987, through May 1, 1987. Id.
12. United Missouri Bank, 901 F.2d at 1450. UMB claims that the four million
dollar payment was a deposit into the Kroh Brothers bank account and that the bank
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amendment right to a jury trial in certain bankruptcy proceedings, including
those involving preferential transfer issues. 5
Bankruptcy Judge See had little difficulty in finding that UMB was
entitled to a jury trial under the guidelines established by Granfinanciera.
That case established that a party, when sued by the trustee of a bankrupt
estate to recover an alleged preferential transfer, is entitled to a jury trial. 16
The critical issue before Judge See was whether the bankruptcy court had the
power to hear the jury trial or whether the district court must hear such
trials. 17 She concluded that in the case of core proceedings,' 8 bankruptcy
courts have statutory and constitutional authority to hear jury trials. 19 This
statutory authority was based upon a "comprehensive reading" of the relevant
sections of the bankruptcy statutes. 20  Thus, Judge See granted UMB the
right to a jury trial, but refused to withdraw the case from the bankruptcy
court.
21
On appeal, United States District Court Judge Sachs affirmed the ruling
of the bankruptcy court, thus denying UMB's withdrawal motion but affirming
UMB's right to a jury trial. 2 Judge Sachs, following the reasoning of Judge
See, emphasized two recent decisions 23 that concluded that bankruptcy courts
have both statutory and constitutional authority to conduct jury trials. Judge
Sachs found that a bankruptcy court is not prevented by its article I status
from holding a jury trial, and thus there is "nothing inherently inappropriate"
with conducting such a trial in the bankiuptcy forum.
2 4
UMB filed a Petition for Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition with the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which reversed the district and
15. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 79-80. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying
text for discussion of Granfinanciera.
16. In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co. v. United Missouri Bank of Kansas City, 108
Bankr. 710, 712 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989).
17. Id.
18. See infra notes 52-59 and accompanying text for discussion of core and non-
core proceedings.
19. Kroh Bros., 108 Bankr. at 716.
20. Id. at 712. Judge See relied upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157, 1411 (1988) as
authority for bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials. Id. at 712-14. See infra note
76 and accompanying text for a discussion of § 151. See infra notes 52-75 and
accompanying text for a discussion of § 157. See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying
text for a discussion of § 1411.
21. Kroh Bros., 108 Bankr. at 716.
22. Kroh Bros. Dev. Co. v. United Missouri Bank of Kansas City, 108 Bankr.
228, 229-30 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989).
23. Id. at 229. See Dailey v. First Peoples Bank, 76 Bankr. 963 (D. N.J. 1987);
McCormick v. Am. Investors Management, Inc., 67 Bankr. 838 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1986).
24. Kroh Bros., 108 Bankr. at 229.
1991]
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bankruptcy court decisions.2 The court agreed that UMB possessed a
seventh amendment right to a jury trial, but found that the bankruptcy court
did not have proper statutory authority to conduct such a trial.6 In an
opinion written by Chief Justice Lay, the Eighth Circuit focused on and
rejected the reasoning of the Second Circuit's recent decision in In re Ben
Cooper, Inc.,27 which held that a bankruptcy judge has both statutory and
constitutional authority to hear jury trials in core proceedings.7 Because the
Eighth Circuit found no evidence of statutory authority, the court did not
address the issue of constitutional authority.29 Because the Eighth Circuit
discovered no evidence of express or implied statutory authority for a
bankruptcy judge to conduct a jury trial, the court remanded the case to the
district court rather than to the bankruptcy court.30
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Statutory History
The legislative history of the authority possessed by the bankruptcy court
is a long, confusing, and often contradictory journey dating from 1898, the
year of the first bankruptcy act.3' To fully comprehend the issues posed by
the instant case, one must first understand the creation of bankruptcy courts
and article I courts in general. Bankruptcy courts are article I courts created
by Congress, and are of limited jurisdiction. Thus, they cannot exercise the
wide range of powers held by article III courts. 32 The powers of article I
courts are limited by the Constitution as well as by congressional authority.33
Before 1978, bankruptcy courts derived their statutory authority from the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898.3' Bankruptcy "referees" had summary jurisdic-
tion35 over all equitable proceedings arising out of the bankrupt estate. All
25. United Missouri Bank, 901 F.2d at 1450-51.
26. Id. at 1454-57.
27. 896 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir. 1990).
28. Id. at 1402-04.
29. United Missouri Bank, 901 F.2d at 1457.
30. Id. at 1454-57.
31. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1979).
32. United Missouri Bank, 901 F.2d at 1451-52 (citing Northern Pipeline Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982)).
33. Id. at 1452.
34. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1979).
35. Gibson, supra note 2, at 971 n.20. Gibson describes the three categories of
summary jurisdiction as follows:
[Vol. 56
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other bankruptcy matters were conducted within the plenary jurisdiction36 of
the district court. Historically, jury trials were not allowed in the bankruptcy
forum except for two narrow exceptions involving involuntary petitions and
the dischargeability of debts. 37 The 1898 Act, however, gave no indication
as to which court was to conduct the jury trial if one of these exceptions was
applicable.38 In Katchen v. Landry,39 the Supreme Court stated that the
summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court was equitable in nature and did
not entail conducting jury trials. Katchen carved out an exception to the
seventh amendment right to a jury trial when Congress grants jurisdiction to
a court of equity containing "a specific statutory scheme contemplating the
prompt trial of a disputed claim without the intervention of a jury."40 Thus,
the right to a jury trial did not exist in a bankruptcy court under the 1898 Act.
In 1978, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act41 ("the 1978
Act"), which radically revised bankruptcy laws and procedures. The 1978 Act
granted broad jurisdictional authority to the bankruptcy judge, including an
apparent right to hear jury trials under section 1480:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, this chapter and
title 11 do not affect any right to trial by jury, in a case under title 11 or in
a proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under
title 11, that is provided by any statute in effect on September 30, 1979.
1) The exclusive jurisdiction over all administrative matters arising under
the bankruptcy proceeding;
2) the exclusive right to determine title to and possession of disputed assets
within the court's possession;
3) the right to rule on matters submitted to the bankruptcy judge with the
consent of the parties.
Id.
36. See United Missouri Bank, 901 F.2d at 1452. Plenary jurisdiction includes
"litigation involving the trustee and third parties brought in the form of an ordinary
civil action. If the action is brought in the federal court, the right of jury trial ... is
determined according to the nature of the issues, just as in any other civil action."
Gibson, supra note 2, at 1013 n.213 (quoting J. MOORE & W. PHILLIPS, DEBTORS'
AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS 6-1 to 6-2 (1966)).
37. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541 §§ 17(c)(5), 19, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1979).
38. See United vissouri Bank, 901 F.2d at 1452; Gibson, supra note 2, at 974.
39. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
40. Id. at 339.
41. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1 to-1329 (repealed 1984)).
1991]
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(b) The bankruptcy court may order the issuds arising under section 303
under title 11 [governing involuntary bankruptcy petitions] to be tried
without a jury.42
Although subsection (b) of section 1480 clearly reversed the earlier practice
of allowing involuntary petition jury trials in the bankruptcy court, subsection
(a) apparently granted authority to the bankruptcy court to conduct jury trials
in other bankruptcy proceedings. Although section 1480 was open to
conflicting interpretation, 43 most courts concluded that it was an authorized
grant of power for bankruptcy judges to hear jury trials."
The broad grant of jurisdiction within the 1978 Act was held unconstitu-
tional by a Supreme Court plurality in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co. 45 The Marathon court concluded that the 1978 Act
had "impermissibly removed most, if not all, of 'the essential attributes of the
judicial power' from the art. III district court, and had vested those attributes
in a non-art. III adjunct. "46  Because Congress delayed in amending the
Bankruptcy Code after Marathon, the Administrative Office of the Courts
quickly promulgated an Emergency Rule in 1982 that prohibited bankruptcy
judges from hearing jury trials. 47 Under the Emergency Rule, if a bankrupt-
cy matter required a jury trial, only the district court was authorized to
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1480 (repealed 1984).
43. Commentators and courts argued whether section 1480 maintained the
summary/plenary distinction of the 1898 Act or whether the summary/plenary approach
was abandoned in favor of the traditional seventh amendment approach used by the
district court in a civil case. See Bever & Cantrel, supra note 2, at 803-804; Gibson,
supra note 2, at 976-86. Compare Nickinello v. Roberson (In re Huey), 23 Bankr.
804, 805 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982); Martin Baker Well Drilling v. Koulovatros (In re
Martin Baker Well Drilling, Inc.), 36 Bankr. 154 (Bankr. D. Me. 1984) (both cases use
the pure seventh amendment approach) with Belfance v. Sizzler Steak Houses (In re
Portage Assoc., Inc.), 16 Bankr. 445 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982); In re Lafayette Radio
Electronics Corp., 7 Bankr. 187 (B'nkr. E.D.N.Y. 1980).
44. See, e.g., Nickinello v. Roberson (In re Huey), 23 Bankr. 804, 805 (Bankr.
9th Cir. 1982); Young v. Peter J. Saker, Inc. (In re Paula Saker & Co., Inc.), 37
Bankr. 802 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); Martin Baker Well Drilling, Inc. v. Koulovatros
(In re Martin Baker Well Drilling, Inc.), 36 Bankr. 154 (Bankr. D. Me. 1984); King,
supra note 2, at 703.
45. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
46. Id. at 87.
47. Vihon, Delegation of Authority and the Model Rule: The Continuing Saga
of Northern Pipeline, 88 CoM. L.J. 64, 77-8 (1983) (reprinting emergency rule issued
by the Administrative Office of the Courts). Section (d)(1) of the Emergency Rule
states that "bankruptcy judges may not conduct: ... (D) jury trials." Id. at 78. See
Gibson, supra note 2, at 987 n.87.
[Vol. 56
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conduct the trial.48 When the revised bankruptcy rules were issued the
following year, however, Bankruptcy Rule 901541 appeared to reauthorize
jury trials by providing procedural guidelines for conducting jury trials in the
bankruptcy forum. Therefore, Rule 9015 was in direct conflict with the
Emergency Rule and many courts viewed Rule 9015 as taking precedence
over the Emergency Rule."0 As a result, the questions of whether a jury trial
right existed and in what forum that jury trial was to be held remained
unsettled.
Responding to the confusion, Congress finally issued the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 ("the 1984 Act"). 51 This
act limited the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts and bifurcated the
bankruptcy judge's authority according to whether a proceeding was core or
non-core. 2 In non-core proceedings, the bankruptcy judge may only hear the
case and submit findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court,
which maintains the authority to enter a final judgment.53 With the consent
of both parties, the bankruptcy judge may "hear and determine" a non-core
proceeding and accordingly "enter appropriate orders and judgements. '
The fact that the district court retains the right to enter a final judgment
in a non-core proceeding is inconsistent with the seventh amendment provision
that "no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of
the United States." 55 Thus, the de novo review of a non-core proceeding is
incompatible with the right to a jury trial.56 In core proceedings, 57 howev-
48. See Vihon, supra note 47, at 78.
49. FED. R. BANKR. 9015, 11 U.S.C. §1411 app. at 140 (Supp. IV 1986) (repealed
1987).
50. See, e.g., Young v. Peter J. Saker, Inc. (In re Paula Saker & Co., Inc.), 37
Bankr. 802, 809 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); Martin Baker Well Drilling v. Koulovatros
(In re Martin Baker Well Drilling, Inc.), 36 Bankr. 154, 158 (Bankr. D. Me. 1984).
51. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1984)).
52. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (1988).
53. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (1988).
54. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (1988).
55. U.S CONST. amend. VII (1791).
56. See, e.g., United Missouri Bank, 901 F.2d at 1453; Dailey v. First Peoples
Bank, 76 Bankr. 963, 968 (D. N.J. 1987); Pied Piper Casuals, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of State
of Pa., 72 Bankr. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Smith-Douglass, Inc. v. Smith (In re Smith-
Douglass, Inc.), 43 Bankr. 616, 618 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984). But see THB Corp. v.
Essex Builders Co., Inc. (In re THB Corp.), 94 Bankr. 797, 800 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1988); Price Watson Co. v. Amex Steel Corp. (In re Price Watson Co.), 66 Bankr.
144, 157 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 157 (b)(2)(1988) states the following:
2) Core proceedings include, but are not limited to -
1991)
7
McDowell: McDowell: Statutory Authority for Bankruptcy
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
er, the bankruptcy judge may "hear and determine" the proceeding and "enter
appropriate orders and judgments," subject to review by the district court."
Granfinanciera states that the jurisdiction of certain core proceedings, such as
the preferential transfer claim in United Missouri Bank, is consistent with the
seventh amendment right to a jury trial.59 The scope of Granfinanciera is
limited, however, to core proceedings and does not involve non-core actions.
Rather than specifically settling the jury trial issue, the 1984 Act
confused courts and commentators by enacting section 1411,60 which referred
(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;
(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or
exemptions from property of the estate, and estimation of claims
or interests for the purposes of confirming a plan under chapter
11, 12, or 13 of title 11 but not the liquidation or estimation of
contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death
claims against the estate for purposes of distribution in a case
under title 11;
(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims
against the estate;
(D) orders in respect to obtaining credit;
(E) orders to turn over property of the estate;
(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;
(G) motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay;
(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent
conveyances;
(1) determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts;
(J) objections to discharges;
(K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens;
(L) confirmation of plans;
(M) orders approving the use or lease of property, including the
use of cash collateral;
(N) orders approving th sale of property other than property
resulting from claims brought by the estate against persons who
have not filed claims against the estate; and
(0) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of
the estate or the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity
security holder relationship, except personal injury tort or
wrongful death claims.
58. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (1984). Section 157(b)(1) states: "Bankruptcy judges
may hear and determine all cases under title 11 and all core proceedings arising under
title 11, or arising in a case under title 11 ... and may enter appropriate orders and
judgments, subject to review under section 158 of this title."
59. Granfinanciera, 492'U.S. at 80.
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1411 (1988).
[Vol. 56
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to jury trials only in connection with cases involving wrongful death and tort-
related actions. Section 1411 states:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, this chapter and
title 11 do not affect any right to trial by jury that an individual has under
applicable nonbankruptcy law with regard to a personal injury or wrongful
death tort claim.
(b) The district court may order the issues arising under section 303
[involving involuntary bankruptcies] of title 11 to be tried without a
jury.
61
Many commentators contend that section 1411 limits the district court to hear
jury trials in only these two specific actions and that all other jury trials are
to be held in the bankruptcy forum. 62 Others argue, however, that the lack
of express language prevents bankruptcy courts from conducting jury trials.'
Several courts have cited this lack of express authority, in addition to the
Marathon decision, as a basis for refusing to allow a non-article III bankrupt-
cy judge to preside over jury trials.6 The legislative record of section 1411
is relatively silent on the matter, further complicating the issue.65
Finally, in 1987, the newly created Bankruptcy Rules replaced Bankrupt-
cy Rule 9015,6 which had provided procedural guidelines for jury trials in
the bankruptcy forum. 67 This raised serious doubts as to whether statutory
authority existed for bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials because some
authorities had relied upon Rule 9015 as granting jury trial authority.6 The
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., M & E Contractors, Inc. v. Kugler-Morris Gen. Contractors, Inc.,
67 Bankr. 260, 267 (N.D. Tex. 1986); Price-Watson Co. v. Amex Steel Corp. (In re
Price-Watson Co.), 66 Bankr. 144, 152 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986); Baldwin-United Corp.
v. Thompson (In re Baldwin-United Corp.), 48 Bankr. 49, 56 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985).
63. See, e.g., Jefferson Nat'l Bank v. Durbin, Inc. (In re Durbin, Inc.), 62 Bankr.
139, 146 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Terry v. Prochl (In re Proehl), 36 Bankr. 86, 88 (W.D. Va.
1984); Hoffman v. Brown (In re Brown), 56 Bankr. 487, 488-91 (Bankr. D. Md.
1985); King, supra note 2, at 704.
64. See, e.g., Cameron v. Anderson (In re American Energy, Inc.), 50 Bankr. 175,
181 (Barkr. D. N.D. 1985); Proehl, 36 Bankr. at 87; Brown, 56 Bankr. at 488.
65. See United Missouri Bank, 901 F.2d at 1455; Bever & Cantrel, supra note 2,
at 806; Gibson, supra note 2, at 991.
66. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bankruptcy
Rule 9015.
67. See Committee Note to Abrogation of Bankr. R. 9015, reprinted in
Bankruptcy Service § 62:175 (1987).
68. See, e.g., Howison v. Country Hills Assocs. (In re W.G.M.C., Inc.), 96 Bankr.
1991]
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issue of where a bankruptcy jury trial should be conducted has remained
unanswered, primarily because of the unclear statutory language and because,
until Granfinancierd, the seventh amendment right to a jury trial in a
bankruptcy proceeding was uncertain.
B. Recent Case History
The statutory authority for bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials is
confusing and contradictory. Courts attempting to grapple with this issue have
responded with a wide range of opinions and conclusions. To fully analyze
the reasoning of United Missouri Bank, it is necessary to discuss two recent
United States Courts of Appeals decisions that address the same issue. The
first case, In re Ben Cooper, Inc.,69 was decided in February of 1990, only
two months before United Missouri Bank. The Second Circuit found statutory
and constitutional authority for jury trials in the bankruptcy forum. In
August of 1990, however, only four months after United Missouri Bank, the
Tenth Circuit decided In re Kaiser Steel Corp.7' The court agreed with the
Eighth Circuit in finding that bankruptcy judges may not conduct jury trials
due to a lack of statutory authority.72 In June of 1990, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to Ben Cooper, but subsequently vacated the
judgment and remanded the case to the Second Circuit to decide a jurisdic-
tional question.73
The Second Circuit conceded that the 1984 Bankruptcy Act does not
confer express jury trial authority upon the bankruptcy court. The court stated
that section 1411 of the 1984 Act provides little assistance in answering the
question of when or where a jury trial should be conducted.74 Despite this
absence of express language in the 1984 Act, the Second Circuit concluded
there is sufficient implied authority based on two separate but related
provisions of the United States Code.75 First, 28 U.S.C. section 151 provides
that "[e]ach bankruptcy judge, as a judicial officer of the district court, may
5, 7 (Bankr. D. Me. 1989); Wceks v. Kramer (In re G. Weeks Sec., Inao.), 89 Bankr.
697, 715 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1988); Sabino, supra note 2, at 256-58.
69. Ben Cooper Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 896 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir. 1990), vacated on
other grounds, 111 S.Ct. 425 (1990).
70. Id. at 1402-04.
71. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Frates (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 911 F.2d 380 (10th
Cir. 1990).
72. Id. at 389.
73. Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania v. Ben Cooper, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 425 (1990).
74. Ben Cooper, 896 F. 2d at 1402. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying
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exercise the authority conferred under this chapter with respect to any action,
suit or proceeding. 7 6 Second, 28 U.S.C. section 157(b) grants bankruptcy
judges "the authority to conduct trials and issue final orders in core proceed-
ings." 77 In reconciling Granfinanciera with these two provisions, the Second
Circuit concluded that jury trials must be allowed in the bankruptcy court.78
The court then examined two potential constitutional barriers, which they
ultimately found not to prevent a bankruptcy court from conducting a jury
trial.79
In Kaiser Steel, the Tenth Circuit, having searched the language and
legislative record of the 1984 Act, concluded that no evidence existed of
express or implied statutory authority.80 The court pointed to the repeal of
section 1481 of the 1978 Act, which had given the bankruptcy courts "the
powers of a court of equity, law and admiralty," as evidence of their
finding. 8' The Tenth Circuit rejected the Second Circuit's interpretation that
76. 28 U.S.C § 151 (1988).
77. Ben Cooper, 896 F. 2d at 1402. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (1988) states as
follows:
Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases under title 11 and all
core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11,
referred under subsection (a) of this section, and may enter appropriate
orders and judgments, subject to review under section 158 of this title.
78. Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1402.
79. Id. at 1403-04. The Second Circuit in Ben Cooper, having found proper
statutory authority, addressed the constitutional problems posed by the seventh
amendment and article I1l. The seventh amendment provides that no fact determined
by a jury may be reexamined by another court of law. The court conceded that
noncore proceedings may violate the seventh amendment because the findings of fact
determined at the bankruptcy court level are required to be reviewed de novo by the
district court. Id. However, "[s]ince the jury verdict in a core proceeding is subject
only to the traditional standards of appellate review, such proceeding does not violate
the Seventh Amendment." Id. See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text for a
discussion of core and noncore distinction.
The second constitutional impediment is whether jury trials in the bankruptcy
court violated article III of the Constitution. The court concluded that Marathon does
not prohibit bankruptcy judges from entering final judgements in core proceedings.
Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1402. The court reasoned that if bankruptcy judges have the
power to enter final judgements in core proceedings, then surely jury trials in the
bankruptcy court are permissable. 1I. The power to conduct jury trials was found not
to contradict the primary purpose of article III: "to insure a federal judiciary free from
pressure from the other branches of government." Id. The court illustrated that jury
trials have been upheld in other article I forums such as the District of Columbia and
federal magistrate courtrooms. Id.
80. Kaiser Steel, 911 F.2d at 389-92.
81. Id. at 391.
11
McDowell: McDowell: Statutory Authority for Bankruptcy
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
the power to issue final orders and judgments in 28 U.S.C. section 157(b)(1)
included the power to conduct jury trials and that the words "hear and
determine," contained in 28 U.S.C. section 157(b)(1), did not imply jury trial
authority but rather suggested the opposite conclusion because the bankruptcy
judge cannot review the jury's factual findings.82 The court was further
convinced that because Congress had previously given article I courts express
authority to conduct jury trials, the lack of this express language implied that
bankruptcy judges are not to preside over jury trials.83 The Tenth Circuit
concluded that, even though Granfinanciera suggested giving this power to
conduct jury trials to bankruptcy courts, it was improper to grant authority
when Congress has not clearly delegated it.8
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In United Missouri Bank, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
ruled that UMB was entitled to a jury trial, but the trial had to be held in the
district court because the bankruptcy court lacked statutory authority to preside
over a jury trial. The court began its analysis with a discussion of the
Granfinanciera decision. Once the court determined that Granfinanciera
was controlling, it had little difficulty finding that UMB, as a party to an
adversarial proceeding, was entitled to a jury trial.I
The majority spent little time addressing whether express authority exists
for bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials. Section 157 of the 1984
Bankruptcy Act, which authorizes bankruptcy courts to conduct certain
proceedings, contains no express language conferring jury trial authority on
the bankruptcy court.87 The court noted that the 1984 Act only discusses
jury trials in reference to the district court.ss Because Congress has given
82. Id.
83. Id. at 391-92.
84. Id. at 392.
85. United Missouri Bank, 901 F.2d at 1451.
86. Id. The court concluded the following: "Thus, a party to an adversary
proceeding in bankruptcy may have a seventh amendment right to a jury trial before
some tribunal, and since there has been no claim filed against the Kroh bankruptcy
estate, Granfinanciera controls here." Id. The court proceeded by giving a historical
background of the statutory authority possessed by bankruptcy courts, stressing a desire
at all times to determine the intent of Congress. Id. at 1451-54.
87. Id. at 1454. See discussion of 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1988) supra notes 52-59 and
accompanying text.
88. United Mivsouri Bank, 901 F.2d at 1454. 28 U.S.C § 157(b)(5) (1988) states
the following: "The district court shall order that personal injury tort and wrongful
death claims shall be tried in the district court .... "
[Vol. 56
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express statutory authority to hear jury trials to non-article III courts in the
past, the court concluded that because Congress did not include express
language in the 1984 Act, bankruptcy courts do not have the authority to
conduct jury trials in core proceedings.89
Failing to find express authority within the language of the 1984 Act, the
court searched the legislative record for evidence of implied congressional
authority.90 The court rejected the argument, grounded on section 1411, that
because district courts are instructed to hear jury trials in two specific actions,
all other jury trials are to be held in the bankruptcy forum.91 The court
reasoned that because no significant mention of extending jury trial authority
exists in the legislative record of the 1984 Act, it is beyond the intent of
Congress to grant this authority.92
Because Granfinanciera mandates a jury trial in fraudulent transfer
claims, the Eighth Circuit conceded that although there is no express authority
to conduct jury trials, the authority can be implied to make the legislation
effective.93 This reasoning was used by the Second Circuit in Ben Cooper
to find statutory authority. 94  The Eighth Circuit, however, rejected the
Second Circuit's finding that the only way to reconcile the congressional
intent with the holding of Granfinanciera is to imply authorization for the
bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials.95 The instant court found it more
likely that Congress never considered whether one has a right to a jury trial
in bankruptcy or which court would conduct such a trial.96 Even though a
finding of implied statutory authority is not contrary to the bankruptcy
legislation, the court stated that for the power to be implied, it must be
89. United Missouri Bank, 901 F.2d at 1454. The court referred to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 636(a)(3), (c)(1) (1988), which authorize magistrates to conduct jury trials in
specific cases, as evidence that Congress has previously granted express statutory
authority to non-Article III judges to conduct jury trials. Id.
90. United Missouri Bank, 901 F.2d. at 1454-57.
91. Id. at 1454-55.
92. Id. at 1455. The court referred to a comment in the legislative record, which
provides little direction due to its vagueness. See 130 CONG. REC. H6242 (daily ed.
Mar. 21, 1984). The court concluded, however, that "if anything can be gleaned from
this commentary, it is that Congress intended to continue the Emergency Rule's
prohibition against bankruptcy judges conducting jury trials." United Missouri Bank,
901 F.2d. at 1455.
93. Id. at 1455.
94. Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pa. (In re Ben Cooper, Inc.), 896 F.2d 1394,
1402 (2d Cir. 1990), vacated on other grounds, 111 S.Ct. 425 (1990). See supra notes
72-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of Ben Cooper.
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"practically indispensable and essential."97 The court went on to hold that
the power to conduct jury trials is not indispensable for bankruptcy judges to
carry out their duties conferred by the 1984 Act.98
The Eighth Circuit concluded that it must not overstep its bounds to
imply jury trial authority simply to create a more efficient and systematic
bankruptcy scheme.99 The court's decision reflects the principle that courts
should "avoid an interpretation of a federal statute that engenders constitu-
tional issues if a reasonable alternative poses no constitutional question."
°
The reasonable alternative is to have the district court conduct the jury trial.
Because of the lack of express statutory language and legislative support, in
addition to the constitutional questions, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that
bankruptcy judges have no statutory authority to conduct jury trials.ibl
V. DISCUSSION
A. Analysis
In United Missouri Bank, the Eighth Circuit, agreeing with two other
circuits, concluded there is no express statutory language within the 1984
Bankruptcy Act for bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials. The circuits
reached opposite conclusions regarding the existence of implied authority.
The reasoning of the Eighth Circuit that no implied authority exists is
persuasive for several reasons. The lack of express or implied language in the
1984 Act and throughout the legislative record clearly supports the Eighth
Circuit's holding that bankruptcy judges may not preside over jury trials.
There are three possible explanations for this lack of express or implied
statutory language. First, in 1984, Congress was unsure if a right to a jury
trial existed in a bankruptcy proceeding, and therefore omitted the necessary
language altogether. Congress, however, had no intention of forbidding jury
trials in the bankruptcy court if a seventh amendment right did exist. The
Second Circuit used this reasoning in finding sufficient implied authority.
10 2
A second argument is that Congress, by not expressly authorizing jury trial
authority in a bankruptcy matter, did not intend in any way to grant that right
to the bankruptcy court.0' A more plausible explanation for a lack of
express language is that Congress never considered which court should
97. Id. (quoting 2A SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. § 55.03 (4th ed. 1972)).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1456 (quoting Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989)).
101. United Missouri Bank, 901 F.2d at 1457.
102. Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1402.
103. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
742 , [Vol. 56
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conduct a jury trial in a bankruptcy proceeding because "[u]ntil
Granfinanciera, it was possible for Congress to presume that jury trial rights
would not extend to core proceedings.""°4 This view is consistent with the
chaotic legislative and case history that has developed over the years since the
1898 Bankruptcy Act. On this matter the Eighth Circuit concluded:
We think it more plausible that Congress simply intended [by enacting the
1984 Act] to transfer all proceedings relating to the bankruptcy estate to the
sole jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court without regard to whether a party
was entitled to a jury trial, or.which forum would conduct the trial. In fact,
it appears Congress did not even consider the need to provide jury trial
authority. 5
Congress is well aware of the language necessary to authorize bankruptcy
courts to preside over jury trials. The lack of statutory authority cannot be
overcome merely because Granfinanciera authorized a jury trial right in
certain core proceedings. Furthermore, it is not desirable to imply authority
where Congress has not clearly expressed an intent to delegate that authority.
The Eighth and Tenth Circuits were critical of the Second Circuit's
reasoning in finding proper statutory authority for bankruptcy judges to
conduct jury trials.'"' The language of 20 U.S.C. section 157(b), which
allows bankruptcy judges to enter final judgments in core proceedings, was
most likely not intended to grant jury trial authority because at the time of the
statute's enactment, it was doubtful that a jury trial right existed in bankruptcy
matters. Congress created the 1984 Act in response to the Marathon decision,
which held that the broad jurisdiction of the 1978 Act, including authority for
bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials, was unconstitutional." 7  The
legislative history leading up to the enactment of the 1984 Act simply does
not allow an interpretation that Congress impliedly authorized bankruptcy
judges to conduct jury trials. Even though Granfinaciera suggests allowing
a bankruptcy judge to conduct core proceedings involving a jury trial, courts
cannot ignore the lack of express or implied statutory authority merely to
create a more efficient bankruptcy system.
An argument not raised by the Eighth Circuit is that the removal of Rule
9015 in 1987 was conclusive proof that bankruptcy courts are not to conduct
jury trials.' Rule 9015 had formerly given procedural rules for jury trials
104. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Frates (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 911 F.2d 380, 392
(10th Cir. 1990).
105. United Missouri Bank, 901 F.2d at 1456 (footnotes omitted).
106. Id. at 1456; KaLer Steel, 911 F.2d at 391.
107. See Marathon, 958 U.S. at 50.
108. See discussion of Rule 9015 supra notes 49-50, 66-68 and accompanying
1991]
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in the bankruptcy court and was considered evidence that bankruptcy judges
could conduct jury trials.
B. Practical Considerations
Because Granfinanciera authorized jury trials in certain bankruptcy
proceedings, the practical problems of which forum is best suited to conduct
these jury trials must be addressed. Regardless of the outcome of Ben Cooper,
the following practical considerations may be useful'in determining the future
of jury trials in bankruptcy matters. For example, assuming that no authority
exists for allowing jury trials in the bankruptcy forum, these considerations
may help in deciding whether Congress should grant this authority. On the
other hand, if the Supreme Court finds implied statutory authority in Ben
Cooper, these considerations may also be helpful in determining whether
procedural guidelines are needed to create a more efficient and consistent
scheme of trying jury trials in the bankruptcy forum.
Before discussing these practical considerations, one must consider why
Congress implemented the bankruptcy court system in the first place.
Congress designed the bankruptcy system to provide quick and efficient
resolution of bankruptcy matters. Allowing bankruptcy judges to conduct jury
trials would reduce the overall efficiency of the bankruptcy system. "[J]ury
trials are arguably inconsistent with the expeditious resolution of bankruptcy
proceedings as mandated by Congress and the courts." °9 On the other hand,
transferring a jury trial to the district court will extend, sometimes by many
months, the resolution of the case. This transfer would not delay other cases
on the bankruptcy docket, but it would add a burden to the overloaded dockets
of the district court. Therefore, the district and bankruptcy courts may have
to partially sacrifice their .efficiency objectives to process these bankruptcy
jury trials.
A second consideration is whether a bankruptcy court is a suitable forum
to conduct a jury trial. As mentioned previously, the bankruptcy court is
designed to bring a quick and efficient resolution to bankruptcy matters.
Bankruptcy judges are not appointed to preside over lengthy adversarial
disputes; they are expected to expeditiously resolve bankruptcy matters in the
best interests of both the debtors and the creditors. "[B]ankruptcy cases
should be separated from the adjudication of adversarial controversies arising
out of them."'1 ° Jury trials are more complex proceedings and involve many
aspects different from a normal bankruptcy proceeding. These differences
include the selection of jurors, formal rules of evidence, more complex
text.
109. Bever & Cantrel, supra note 2, at 824.
110. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, App. 2, at 81 (15th ed. 1990).
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procedure rules, and a different apportionment of the roles of the judge and
jury. The Second Circuit, which found authority for conducting jury trials in
the bankruptcy court, noted that no jury trial procedure currently exists in the
Bankruptcy Rules.' The Second Circuit suggested relying on Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 38 or upon local rules similar to Rule 9015, now repealed,
for proper jury trial procedure in the bankruptcy court." If a bankruptcy
court is to conduct jury trials, procedural guidelines will be necessary to create
an efficient and consistent scheme of processing these trials.13
The appropriateness of a jury trial in either forum raises the possibility
of inadvertent bias by the presiding judge. Although the jury maintains the
duty of making the factual determinations, the judge retains considerable
discretion in granting or denying the different motions made by the parties.
A creditor entitled to a jury trial under the seventh amendment may prefer a
district court judge. The creditor may fear that a bankruptcy judge will
naturally favor the rehabilitation of the debtor over the claims of the creditor.
This fear may be the underlying motive when a creditor, such as UMB in the
instant case, demands that the district court conduct the jury trial. Creditors
may feel that the district court is a more favorable forum for advancing the
rights of a creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding. The debtor, however, may
naturally prefer the bankruptcy court, with the hope that the bankruptcy judge
will be more sympathetic to the concerns of the debtor. Regardless of where
the jury trial is conducted, the possibility of bias will exist in either court and
does not appear to be a pivotal issue.
The most serious consideration is a belief that all matters relating to the
bankruptcy estate should be conducted in the bankruptcy forum. The
bankruptcy judge is given wide authority under 28 U.S.C. section 157(b)(1)
to "hear and determine all cases." '114 It is more appropriate for a bankruptcy
judge to conduct a bankruptcy related jury trial because of the judge's
expertise in bankruptcy matters, in addition to the judge's familiarity with a
particular case. "[T]he adjudication should be performed by bankruptcy courts
expert in the subject."'1 5 In United Missouri Bank, the complex matter
proceeded within the bankruptcy system for two years before the Eighth
Circuit thrust the matter into the district court because of the jury trial
implications. A forceful argument is that the bankruptcy judge should resolve
111. Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1402-03.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., COLLIER BANKRUPTCY RuLEs PART 2, at 271 (1990), Advisory
Committee Note on Rule 9015: "In the event the court of appeals or the Supreme
Court define a right to jury trial in any bankruptcy matters, a local rule in substantially
the form of Rule 9015 can he adopted."
114. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (1988).
115. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, App. 2, at 81 (15th ed. 1990).
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the bankruptcy matter in its entirety rather than transferring the case to the
district court for the jury trial, only to have the case sent back to the
bankruptcy court after the jury trial. The removal to the district court "impairs
the bankruptcy court's ability to administer and expeditiously resolve
bankruptcy proceedings. 16
A weighing of the various factors suggests that the bankruptcy court is
best suited to conduct the jury trial. Although the Eighth Circuit correctly
decided the statutory authority issue, the result of that decision appears to
conflict with the underlying objectives of the bankruptcy scheme. It is of
paramount importance to maintain the entire matter within the bankruptcy
court to achieve quick, consistent, and expert relief. The disadvantage to this
solution is a slight disruption to the efficiency of the bankruptcy scheme. The
swelling dockets of the district courts, however, will not have to bear this
burden. Procedural guidelines also can be established quickly to ease the
transition for bankruptcy judges who conduct these somewhat unfamiliar
proceedings. Although these considerations encourage the bankruptcy judge
to *conduct the jury trial, they simply cannot overcome the absence of the
necessary statutory authority.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court will soon resolve the issue of whether a bankruptcy
judge has authority to conduct a jury trial." 7 The relevant statutory provi-
sions, as well as the legislative record behind those provisions, provide no
authority for bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials. In United Missouri
Bank, the Eighth Circuit correctly concluded that the legislative records of the
bankruptcy statutes provide no implied authority for bankruptcy courts to
conduct jury trials.
Although United Missouri Bank appears to have reached the proper result
regarding statutory authority, the final result of that case does not promote an
efficient and workable bankruptcy system. Under the present statutory
language, United Missouri Bank suggests a bifurcated system to resolve
bankruptcy matters involving jury trials. This bifurcated system demonstrates
the need for Congress to enact new legislation, within the limits established
by Marathon, to allow jury trials in the bankruptcy forum. The simplest
solution is for Congress to convey to bankruptcy judges, as they have done in
116. Bever & Cantrel, supra note 2, at 825.
117. See e.g., Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir. 1990), vacated on other
grounds, 111 S.Ct. 425 (1990) (The Supreme Court remanded this case to the Court
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the past with other article I courts, the power to hear jury trials within the
limits of the seventh amendment and article III of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court may follow the reasoning of the Second Circuit to
establish implied statutory authority for bankruptcy judges to preside over jury
trials. This finding, however, does not diminish the need for congressional
action to provide rules and procedures for bankruptcy courts to conduct jury
trials in the bankruptcy forum.
KEVIN P. McDOWELL
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